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Barry Smith 
T his is a useful, clearly written study of the philosophical origins of Menger's theorizing in economics . As the author points out in his conclusion: philosophy has been an accom-
panying presence at every stage in the development of Austrian 
economics. Moreover, "Action, that leitmotif of praxeology, has in the 
Austrian tradition received a distinctly Aristotelian analysis. Aus-
trian economics and a realistic philosophy seem made for each other." 
Gordon packs considerable material into a short span, and inevi-
tably some simplifications arise. Thus in defending a view according 
to which Austrian economics arose in reaction to the "Hegelianism" 
of the German Historical School, he ignores the differences which 
existed between the views of Knies, Roscher, Schmoller and other 
members of the German school, as he ignores also recent scholarship 
which points to hitherto unnoticed similarities between the work of 
some of these thinkers and that of Menger. 
Underlying Gordon's treatment of nineteenth-century philosophi-
cal thinking in the German-speaking world is the idea of a division 
into two camps. On the one hand (and here I, too, am guilty of some 
simplification in expounding Gordon's views) is the camp of German 
philosophy, which Gordon sees as being Hegelian, anti-science, and 
organicist. On the other hand is the Austrian camp, which he sees as 
Aristotelian, pro-science, and individualist in its methodology. The 
members of the Historical School are placed in the former camp and 
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are described as having embraced a Hegelian position inimical to the 
development of economic science. Menger, in cont rast , falls squarely 
in the latter camp, and is presented as having shown the way towards 
a genuinely scientific theory of the "principles" of economics, a theory 
capable of being applied at all times and to all cultures. 
The simplification involved in this two-camp hypothesis can be 
seen already in the fact that Brentano, normally and correctly re-
garded as the Austrian philosopher (and as the philosophical repre-
sentative of Austrian Aristotelianism) par excellence, was in fact born 
in Germany, and his Aristotelianism was decisively influenced by the 
thinking of the German metaphysician F. A. Trendelenburg. What is 
more, Hegel himself was seen by his contemporaries as having been 
responsible precisely for a revival of Aristotelianism, and Aristotelian 
elements are quite clearly present in the thinking of those whom he 
influenced (not least, as Meikle and others have shown, in that of 
Marx). 
Interestingly, the two schools of Brentanian philosophy and of 
Mengerian economics were in a number of ways intertwined- to the 
extent that the Brentano school was dubbed the "second" Austrian 
school of value by analogy with the "first" school of Menger. It is 
difficult to establish the degree to which Brentano influenced Menger 
(the history of philosophy is, as Gordon himself points out, not an 
apodictic science), and in my own writings on this matter I have 
preferred to leave this quest ion open. Gordon writes (p. 27) that 
Brentano revived the study of Aristotle in Austria; this, too, is a 
simplification: a certain institutionalized Aristotelianism had sur-
vived in Austria (a Catholic country), as it had not survived in those 
Protestant parts of the German-speaking world influenced by Kant 
and by the Kantian criticism of all "metaphysics." Both Menger and 
Brentano were able to flourish in Austria in part because of this 
Aristotelian background, but all of this makes still more urgent the 
question as to the precise difference between the "Aristotelianism" of 
Hegel, Marx, the German Historical economists, and the "Aris-
totelianism of the Austrians. 
Both groups embraced a suspicion of mathematics. And both 
groups embraced a form of essentialism: they saw the world as being 
structured by "essences" or "natures" and they awarded a central role 
to the necessary laws governing these. (The propositions expressing 
universal connections amongst essences are called by Menger "exact 
laws." It is such laws which constitute a scientific theory in the strict 
sense, as Menger sees it. The general laws of essence of which such 
a theory would consist are moreover subject to no exceptions. In this 
respect they are comparable to the laws of geometry or mechanics, 
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and contrasted with mere statements of fact and with inductive 
hypotheses.) 
Both groups held that we can know what the world is like in virtue 
of its conformity to laws, so that the laws are in some sense intelligi-
ble, a matter of what is accessible to reason. And both held further 
that general essences do not exist in isolation from what is individual. 
Thus they each embraced a variety of immanent realism: they were 
interested in essences and laws as these are manifested in this world, 
and not in any separate realm of incorporeal Ideal Forms of the sort 
which would absorb the attentions of philosophers of a Platonistic 
bent. 
Bot h groups would thus stand opposed to the positivism which 
has been dominant in philosophical circles for the bulk of the present 
century and serves as the unquestioned background of almost all 
contemporary theorizing among scientists themselves. For positivists 
the world consist s of elements that are associated together in acci-
dental and unintelligible ways; all intelligible structures and all 
necessities are the result of thought-constructions introduced by 
man , and the necessities involved can accordingly be exposed without 
remainder as matters of logic and definition. The positivist sees only 
one sort of structure in re, the structure of accidental association. The 
two groups of Aristotelians, in contrast, see also non-trivial yet 
intelligible and law-governed worldly structures, of a sort that one 
can understand. Hence where the positivist sees only one sort of 
change-accidental change (for example of the sort which occurs 
when a horse is run over by a t ruck)-the Aristotelian sees in addition 
intelligible or law-governed change, as, for example, when a foal 
grows up into a horse (or when a state-managed currency begins to 
lose its value in relation to other goods), The presence of intelligible 
change implies, moreover, that there is no "problem of induction" for 
either group of Aristotelians. When we understand a phenomenon as 
the instance of a given species, then this understanding relates also 
to the characteristic patterns of growth and evolution of the phenome-
non in the future and to its characteristic modes of interaction with 
other phenomena. 
In what respects, then, do the German and Austrian Aristotelians 
differ? First, we mention one minor point (which plays too central a 
role in Gordon's exposition): the two groups differ in their respective 
estimations ofthe role and potentialities of scientific theory, and offer 
different accounts of the relations between history and philosophy, 
and also between both of these and "exact" and empirical science. Yet 
these differences are a matter of emphasis only. Thus Marx himself 
embraces the assumption that science is able to penetrate through 
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the ideological obfuscations by which the commonsenical mind (as he 
conceives things) is of necessity affected. Other German philoso-
phers saw philosophy itself as a science, indeed as a rigorous 
science in something like the Mengerian sense. 
The first major difference between the two groups concerns the 
account they give of the degree to which the laws of a science such 
as economics are strictly universal. For Menger and Brentano (as 
for Aristotle before them) strict universality is the necessary pre-
supposition of any scientific theory in the genuine science. Such 
universality is however denied by Marx, for whom laws are in every 
case specific to a given social organism. 1 
The second such difference concerns the issue of methodologi-
cal individualism-a feature which is of course characteristic of 
Menger and his school. Note, however, that Menger was opposed 
not only to the holism or collectivism of the sort that was pro-
pounded by (among others) Marx, but also, at the opposite extreme, 
to atomistic doctrines of social organization. For methodological in-
dividualism deals with individuals not as isolated, independent at-
oms, but as nodes in different sorts of complex cross-leaved rela-
tional systems. Society and its institutions (including the market) 
are not merely additive structures; they share some of the qualities 
of organisms. The behavior of such structures is, for the methodo-
logical individualist, to be understood in the last analysis entirely 
in terms of complex systems of desires, reasons, and motivations 
on the parts of individuals; but the institutional structures them-
selves are for all that real, and the desires, reasons, and motiva-
tions-and thus also the actions-of the constituent members of 
such structures exist and have the texture and content that they 
have only in virtue of the existence of the given institutional 
surroundings. We may recall, in this connection, Aristotle's view of 
the city-state as an organic entity: these and other organicist 
elements in Aristotle's thinking were, I want to suggest, taken over 
by Menger, too, though mediated through the latter's theory of the 
essential laws governing the world of economic and other social 
phenomena. Economics is methodologically individualist when its 
laws are seen as being made true in their entirety by patterns of 
mental acts and actions of individual subjects, but economic phe-
nomena are then grasped by the theorist precisely as the results 
or outcomes of combinations and interactions of the thoughts and 
actions of individuals. 
lCf. S. Meikle (1985), p. 6, n. 4. 
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The third major difference turns on the fact that, from the per-
spective of Menger, the theory of value is to be built up exclusively on 
"subjective" foundations, which is to say exclusively on the basis of 
the corresponding mental acts and states of human subjects. Thus 
value for Menger-in stark contrast to Marx-is to be accounted for 
exclusively in terms of the satisfaction of human needs and wants. 
Economic value, in particular, is seen as being derivative of the 
valuing acts of ultimate consumers, and Menger's thinking might 
most adequately be encapsulated as the attempt to defend the possi-
bility of an economics which would be at one and the same time both 
theoretical (dealing in universal principles) and subjectivist in the 
given sense. Among the different representatives of the philosophical 
school of value theory in Austria (Brentano, Meinong, Ehrenfels, etc.) 
subjectivism as here defined takes different forms. 2 All of them share 
with Menger however the view that value exists only in the nexus of 
human valuing acts. 
Finally, the two groups differ in relation to the question of the 
existence of (graspable) laws of historical development. Where Marx, 
in true Aristotelian spirit, sought to establish the "laws of the phe-
nomena," he awarded princi pal importance to the task of establishing 
laws of development, which is to say, laws governing the transition 
from one "form" or "stage" of society to another. He treats the social 
movement as a process of natural history governed by laws,3 and he 
sees the social theorist as having the capacity to grasp such laws and 
therefore also in principle to sanction large-scale interferences in the 
social organism which is the state. Marx himself thereby saw social 
science as issuing in highly macroscopic laws, for example to the 
effect that history must pass through certain well-defined "stages." 
The Aristotelianism of the Austrians is in this respect more modest: 
it sees the exact method as being restricted to essences and to simple 
and rationally intelligible essential connections only, in ways which 
set severe limits on the capacity of theoretical social science to make 
predictions. It is in this connection that the methodological individu-
alism of the Austrians has been criticized by Marxists as a form of 
atomism, though such criticisms assume too readily that methodo-
logical individualism trades in mere "sums." 
What, now, of the German historical economists? As already 
noted, Aristotelian doctrines played a role also in German economic 
2See, on this, the papers collected in Grassl and Smith, eds. (1986). 
3Passage cited by Marx himself in the «Afterword" to the second German edition of 
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influence of Thus for 
t:;ActU 'l.W<7, L'.V"',",U<:7L, as has shown, developed a subjective 
theory of along very similar to those later taken up by 
Menger. Such subjectivism was accepted also by Knies. Moreover, 
Knies and Schmoller with Austrians in denying the exist-
ence of of historical development. In all of 
therefore, the gulf and the German historicists is 
much normally been The German histori-
cists are still crucially distinguished from the Austrians, however, in 
remaining wedded to an inductivistic methodology, regarding history 
as providing a basis of fact from out of which mere empirical gener-
alizations could extracted. CSchmoller, especially, attacked the idea 
of universal or principles of economics.) For an Aristotelian such 
as Menger, in contrast, enumerative induction can never yield 
that sort of knowledge of exact law which constitutes a scientific 
For reason and insight are indispensable to the science 
Austrian conceives it; and (as has stressed) 
science of human action is in fact an indispensable 
nnOSl.UO'll of that sort of which is the task of the 
eds. 1986. Austrian Economics: Historical and 
London and Croom Helm. 
1V.l"'Uld.'t:, S. 1985. Essentialism of Karl Marx. London: Duck-
worth. 
Erich. 1990. "The Influence of German Economics in the Work of 
and MarshalL" In Carl and His Economic Legacy, 
ed. N. London: Duke Press. 
Second Thoughts On 
The Philosophical Origins of Austrian 
Economics. 
David Gordon 
P rofessor Barry Smith's characteristically about my pamphlet me with a welcome opportunity to offer some additions and corrections. I no 
disagreement with Smith's comments, but has at one 
cribed to me a much more ambitious than I 
He thinks I wish to divide "nineteenth-century philosophical 
thinking in the world" into two camps: 
German, which I see as "Hegelian, anti-science, and organicist" and 
Austrian, which in contrast is "Aristotelian, and individu-
alist" (p. 125-26). this view, Smith maintains that Hegel, 
Marx, and the German Historical School display marked affinities 
with the Austrians: both groups, in particular, count as Aristotelian. 
I meant to a much more limited 
Hegel's stress upon organic unity may 
toward a universal science of economics found among Schmoller, 
Sombart and other members of the German Historical School. I also 
had a little to say about Hegel's politics, but I did not 
characterization of Hegel's philosophy, much 
German and Austrian philosophy as a whole. 
Smith's emphasis on the Aristotelian elements in seems to 
me entirely well taken and supported by longstanding "''''''VH:U 
opinion. As an example, one outstanding British authority on 
G. R. G. Mure, in his Introduction to 
Oxford, 1940) devotes first few entirely to Aristotle 
before so much as mentioning HegeL But I venture to that 
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the similarities between Aristotle and Hegel leave my suggestion 
untouched. For Hegel, "the Truth is the Whole" in a way that inhibits 
the elaboration of separate sciences. Like Aristotle, Hegel favored 
teleological explanation; but if, as Hegel thought, everything is or-
ganically related to everything else, how can one develop a distinct 
discipline of economics with universal laws? 
Or so at least it seemed to me in 1988, when I gave the lecture on 
which the pamphlet is based. I did not then know that an important 
study had challenged the view of Hegel's doctrine of internal relations 
which I presented. R. P. Horstmann, in Ontologie und Relationen 
(Koenigstein: Atheneum, 1984) argues strongly that Hegel did not 
support a doctrine of internal relations in the style of the British 
Idealists. Further, Robert B. Pippin, in Hegel's Idealism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), sees Hegel as a "conceptual 
holist" rather than the advocate of a metaphysical thesis. 
But it is exactly here that Hegel's philosophy poses a problem for 
a science of economics. If one believes that our categories gener-
ate contradictions that can only be resolved by resort to a "higher" 
standpoint, and that this overcoming or "sublation" is continually 
repeated, will it not be difficult to construct independent scien-
tific disciplines? Even, then, if my statements about internal 
relation in Hegel need to be changed, my suggestion is still in the 
running. 
To turn to a few details, Smith with complete justice notes that 
my picture of the German Historical School ignores the views of the 
earlier Historical School (his term, "simplifications" is much too 
kind). My remarks on the group should be taken as limited to the 
later Historical School, as I note at page 43 of the pamphlet. When I 
gave the lecture, I did not know the material on the earlier group to 
which Smith refers. 
Smith notes that Brentano was "decisively influenced by the 
thinking of the German metaphysician, F. A. Trendelenburg" (p. 126). 
Certainly, this makes it difficult to assert a complete polarity between 
German and Austrian philosophy; but, once more, this is not my 
thesis. I do not think that Trendelenburg's influence can be used to 
show a similarity between Hegel and Brentano, since Tredelenburg, 
far from being a Hegelian, sharply criticized Hegel's Logic. But Smith 
does not use Trendelenburg for this purpose. 
I think it doubtful that the "presence of intelligible change implies 
... that there is no problem of induction for either group of Aris-
totelians" (p. 127). It is of course right that if one grasps a law-gov-
erned change, one is not restricted to induction by simple enumera-
tion. But does this solve the problem of induction? Does it logically 
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follow from the existence of an intelligible change at a particular time 
that the law will continue to hold in the future? Or are these doubts 
merely an undue Humean skepticism? (I am not sure whether Smith 
intends only to give the view of the Aristolelians or also to endorse 
it.) 
Smith's review has a fundamental failing I have so far ignored: 
he is entirely too easy on me. Before I turn from Smith to my own 
corrections, however, may I say that I hope the rumor is true that 
Smith has forthcoming a book on the philosophy of the Austrian 
School. He is one of the world's foremost authorities on nineteenth 
and twentieth century Austrian philosophy. 
And now for my "second thoughts." At page 7, it would be better 
to say that Sombart knew Mises rather than that the two economists 
were friends. 2 At pages 10-11 I describe the doctrine of internal 
relations in a grossly mistaken way. A supporter of internal rela-
tions thinks that any property of an entity is essential to it. But it 
does not follow from this that any change in a property will affect 
every other property of an entity. Someone might hold that internal 
relations connect only properties and substances, not properties by 
themselves. (A more exigent version of the doctrine would hold that 
every property is internally related to every other property of the 
substance it modifies. A still more demanding version would hold 
every property is internally related to every other property of any 
substance). And the first sentence on p. 10 should read: "the person 
who has met the President is an essentially different person from the 
one who has not." 
At p. 27, when I claim that for Aristotle "[e]mpirical science exists 
as a placeholder for true science, which must work through deduc-
tion," this wrongly suggests that a deductive science for Aristotle is 
non-empiricaL "Empirical" must be understood in the sense of "mere 
empirical hypotheses" of the preceding paragraph. For Aristotle, the 
evident principles of a deductive science come from observation of the 
world. 
Much more serious is the confused discussion of self-evident 
axioms on pp. 27-28. The regress argument of the Nicomachean 
Ethics is used to establish the existence of a highest end. I should 
have explicitly stated that the regress argument that I discuss is a 
generalization of the argument of the Ethics, not given there in the 
form in which I present it. An objection to my discussion which I 
overlooked is this: I claim that a science can have several basic 
axioms: justification need not proceed from a single self-evident 
31 am grateful to Ralph Raico for this point. 
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